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INFO: By pouch to USON New York; POLAD CINCARIB;
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At special closed session COAS/OC December 17 Deputy Under Secretary Johnson made informal, off-the-record report on status NY talks with Soviets over Cuban crisis. Following are highlights, asking Eximex protocol

1. Soviets started out ~~requesting agreement or other formal document~~ between US-USSR-Cuba and adhered to by other OAS members calling for endorsement Castro's five points and QUOTE normalization UNQUOTE relations rest of hemisphere with Cuba. They insisted ground inspection in Cuba should be reciprocated by inspection US and other Caribbean countries.

2. US has been guided in negotiations by these principles: (a) until terms Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange relating inspection in Cuba and future further assurances false safeguards are met question/non-invasion/pledge does not arise; (b) aggressive acts Castro regime matter great concern all American Republics and any agreement must also cover this problem; (c) we have not and do not without prior consultation with them nor our intend discuss any commitment involving other OAS members/ affecting/Rio Treaty obligations; (d) on nature non-invasion/pledge we cannot go beyond President's statement Nov 20 news conference; (e) we avoiding any agreement recognize have valid which would/give Soviets/basis for claiming right to voice in hemispheric affairs.

3. Kennedy-

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3. Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange covered offensive weapons but not Soviet ground forces in Cuba. At time we did not fully appreciate extent these forces. We hope removal offensive weapons will also result removal troops. Within framework of guiding principles we trying draw line which will facilitate their removal. Cannot report much progress.

4. After negotiations with Soviets terminated Castro problem will still remain. Cannot say this juncture what our views will be on what should be done, but we certainly will consult OARs.

5. OAS posture during this serious crisis has been major factor in achieving relatively favorable outcome.

In response questions Johnson made following additional points:

1. Basis for our seeking removal Soviet ground forces are: (a) removal offensive weapons makes their presence to defend those weapons no longer necessary; (b) removal would be helpful US-USSR relations. We desire give Soviets easy way out on removal.

2. Soviet ground forces estimated 12 to 15 thousand men in well-organized and equipped units located in special encampments of their own. We can only speculate as to role.

3. We prefer to leave door open for Soviets to withdraw troops and not make major public issue of it this time or consider measures which COMS/OC might take regarding problem. If in end, troops not withdrawn, then we must consult on situation created.

4. We understand why COMS/OC might experience some sense of frustration doing nothing while negotiations with Soviets continue. Nevertheless we believe COMS/OC

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standing by for possible future action has had useful effect in NY conversations. If conversations not successful (and at present outlook not encouraging) COMS/OS may well wish consider additional action.

NOTE: Pouched by DCT

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